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 The Chilean economy is one that has been studied by many because of its history of 
change through different regimes and because in recent decades has been one of the strongest 
economies in Latin America. In the paper, I will evaluate the Chilean economy from 1964 
through the socialist period, the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, and up to the present. 
Although the Chilean economy has transformed into one of the strongest in Latin America, it is 
the “Chilean Model” under Pinochet which is viewed as a miracle of capitalism. The “Chilean 
Model” can be defined as economic development that occurs due to neo-liberal policies enacted 
under a dictator or strong executive. These neo-liberal policies call for the privatization of 
industry and a laissez-faire attitude that will allow the economy to adjust automatically and grow 
effectively. The “Chilean Model” has been looked at as a success story in a region where many 
nations’ economies have remained stagnant after the fall of a dictator. Instead, Chile has grown 
to be a world leader in many industries including agriculture, forestry, fishing and its most 
important industry, copper mining.  Though the economy is strong, the model has recently been 
criticized and reevaluated. I plan to look at the effectiveness of the Pinochet regime in 
transforming the economy, while showing the true reasons for the development of the Chilean 
economic system.  
 It is important to note that while the social and economic well-being of the people is an 
important issue, and is one that is a key to the understanding of Chile as a nation, it is outside the 
realm of this paper. The goal here is to describe the factors, decisions and participants that led to 
the quick macroeconomic development seen in Chile. For this reason, the socioeconomic 
conditions of the population will only be briefly mentioned.  
 While reading it will be important to realize that many of the decisions made by Pinochet 
and his advisors had to be changed or revoked to better the system during the democratic era. 
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Although, the surge in economic development and growth occurs directly after his term as 
president, Pinochet’s influence is not as strong as it seems on the exterior and the “Chilean 
Model” is not what it has been described to be.  
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 Chile is a narrow, isolated country on the west coast of South America. Its length runs 
through many different climates and geographical systems, from deserts to icecaps and a wide 
variety in between. This differentiation divides the people and the country and affects their 
livelihoods, while at the same time making it a diverse and culturally rich nation. The daily life 
in the northern deserts differs greatly from that of the sheep herders in the Antarctic southern 
regions. 
 Chile is 2,880 miles long and at its widest point is only 265 miles.  At over 292,000 
square miles it is the 38th largest country by land mass (Columbia). The eastern border of the 
country is made up of the Andes Mountains whose tall snow-capped peaks separate Chile from 
Argentina. To the north, Chile is bordered by Peru and Bolivia with these borders often being the 
source of conflict between the nations. The entire western boundary of the country is Pacific 
Ocean shore line.  
 The political borders are not the only limitations caused by the geography. The mountains 
in the east, the desert in the north, and the fjords and extreme cold of the far south restrict the 
populations and their ways of life. The north of the country is home to the Atacama Desert, one 
of the driest in the world. Parts of the desert do not register any annual rainfall. Along with being 
so dry, the Atacama Desert is known for being home to many pre-Hispanic cultures. 
Archaeologists have found artifacts from cultures such as the San Pedro de Atacama, cultures of 
the Río Loa (Loa River), Tiwanaku, the Inca, and others. These groups are responsible for 
creating giant monoliths in the rocks of the desert. Additionally rock art, cave paintings, and the 
tools of daily life have made the Atacama a haven for anthropologists and archaeologists alike 
(Gallardo, 225-42). The Atacama Desert, though beautiful in scenery, is a very difficult place 
to live and only a small portion of the nation’s population lives in the northernmost regions.  
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Politically, Chile consists of fifteen regions. Four of these regions (I, II, III, and XV) 
make up what is generally considered northern Chile. However, these four regions are home to 
only 1.3 million people, about 12 percent of the population (City Population). The difficulties of 
living in the desert include the lack of water and fertile soil. The populations are forced to 
irrigate using the few rivers in the Atacama including the Río Loá and the Río Copiapó. 
Unfortunately, irrigation is an expensive process and causes many disputes. The major economic 
advantages for residents in the north of Chile are the mineral deposits, especially copper. Copper 
is the largest export as well as the largest source of wealth for the country, and the major cities in 
the north are often mining towns (CIA). Though the mineral deposits provide for wealth in Chile 
as a whole, poverty is common in the area and for this reason many people have moved to find 
better options.  
 Like the north of Chile, the south of Chile finds itself outside the reach of the capital, 
Santiago. It too is beautiful but struggles from many of the same problems as the north. Industry 
is sparse and the extreme climate makes farming difficult. Tourism, fishing, sheep herding, and 
agriculture are the largest sources of income in southern Chile. Like the north, population density 
is low and the three southern-most regions are home to a population of just of 630,000 or just 
under 4% of the national total. The far south of Chile is generally considered to be land and 
populations south of the Río Bío- Bío. This area is recognized, unlike the Atacama Desert, as one 
of the rainiest places on earth. Southern Chile is home to hundreds of lakes fed by rivers 
streaming out of the Andes into Chile. Additionally, south of Puerto Montt and the large island 
of Chloé, the country becomes a large string of interconnected islands forming archipelagoes 
south toward Cape Horn. Chile is also home to the southernmost city in the world, Punta Arenas 
whose population of just over 100,000 makes it the only city of substance that far south in the 
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southern hemisphere (City Populations). The islands of the south are collectively known as la 
Tierra del Fuego (land of fire). It has received its name from the large collections of volcanoes 
found in the region.  
 Seismic activity is common throughout all of Chile. Being on the Pacific Coast it is 
considered part of the Ring of Fire that surrounds the Pacific Ocean. During the 20th century 
more than 28 major earthquakes, 6.9 or higher on the Richter scale, shook Chile. Two of these 
were over 8.0 and were by far the greatest cause of damage (USGS). Both of these earthquakes 
were centered in the Central Valley of Chile. Unlike the North and South of the country, the 
Central valley is the most densely populated area and home to the majority of business and 
industry. 
 The Central Valley is considered the heart of Chile. It is centrally located as well as home 
to the largest percentage of the agriculture, industry, population, and the capital city, Santiago. In 
addition to Santiago, the largest urban areas are all located in the Central Valley. The Central 
Valley consists of regions V, VI, VII, VIII and the Metropolitan region surrounding Santiago. 
These five regions make up over 74% of the population with over 12.2 million people living in 
this relatively small area (City Population). This region also has the most habitable climate. The 
Central Valley receives ample rainfall for agriculture and healthy living, rather than the 
overabundance seen in the south. 
 The Central Valley also hosts the largest agricultural centers in the country. Major crops 
are avocadoes, apples, peaches, wheat, rice, citrus, and grapes. Grape production is very 
important to Chile as the wine industry has grown significantly and is based in several different 
areas of the Central Valley. Groups of wineries can be found in the Casablanca Valley, Maipo 
Valley, Aconcagua Valley, and others. Concha y Toro is the largest producer of wine in Chile 
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and the 8th largest wine producer in the World. Concha y Toro is headquartered in the Maipo 
Valley outside of Santiago. 
As home of the largest portion of Chile’s population the Central Valley is also the center 
of Chilean culture.  At the heart of the Chilean culture is Catholicism. Although Catholicism is 
not an official religion in Chile, over 70% of the population is affiliated with the Catholic Church 
as of the 2002 census. Of the remaining population, 15.1% affiliate with a protestant sect of 
Christianity, 8.3% do not affiliate with a religious group, and the final 6.6% affiliate themselves 
with some other religious background (Pew Forum on Religion).   Due to the large Catholic 
majority, many Catholic holidays are celebrated and accepted as national holidays.  
The Catholic influence is a holdover from the arrival of Spanish settlers in the 1540s. 
Although the Spaniards have had the most noticeable effects on the development of Chile, other 
European settlers have had a major impact in the country as well. English, German, and French, 
settlers have influenced the country greatly. These western Europeans arrived in Chile in the late 
18th and early 19th centuries to help develop industry in Valparaíso, Chile’s largest port. These 
settlers founded corporations that caused Valparaíso to become a major economic center. The 
port connected Chile and the Pacific Coast of South America to the rest of the world. Before the 
Panama Canal, Valparaíso was an optimal resting place for ships preparing to cross the Cabo de 
Hornos and move into the Atlantic Ocean. The western European influence was seen not only in 
the economy but in the culture as well. The European groups formed schools, churches, 
hospitals, social clubs, etc. in order to continue practicing their traditions. Even today, this 
western European influence can be seen in the food, dress, and customs of the Chileans. 
 Europeans were not the only peoples to have had an influence on Chilean culture. 
Multiple indigenous groups have had a part in the cultural growth of the country. When the 
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Spanish arrived multiple indigenous groups were present in Chile. However, one group, the 
Mapuche, was able to defeat the Spanish and was the only group in the region not to be 
conquered by either the Incan Empire or the Spanish Conquistadors. Years of fighting has kept 
the Mapuche as a surviving native group in Chile while the others have faded to small numbers if 
a presence can be seen at all. Indigenous populations made up just over 4% of the population in 
the latest census. Of this population, more than 87% declared themselves to be of Mapuche 
descent. Other populations of recognizable size are the Aymaras and the Atacameños both 
located in the North of Chile. 
The Mapuche, though proportionally small in numbers, have been fighting for equal 
rights since the arrival of the Spanish. Over 300 hundred years of intermittent fighting between 
the Spanish/Chileans and the Mapuche is generally known as the War of Arauco. This war ended 
with the “pacification of the Araucania” during the 1880s. Even today, the Mapuche are fighting 
for rights they believe to be owed to them. They have been claiming land rights, and 
conservation rights for the forests they claim. Often they are a persecuted group in Chile and 
suffer from racism. Additionally, in a similar fashion to indigenous groups elsewhere, many 
Mapuche suffer from poverty and other social issues such as alcoholism and poor education.  
In spit of this history of tension with a persistent indigenous group, on the surface the 
Chilean people seem to be very homogenous. However, they are a very diverse group in part due 
to the geographic barriers of the country as well as its history. It could be asked why Argentina 
did not just move over and complete the continent? It would seem logical to think a strip of land 
so narrow could be conquered by a larger, stronger country with relative ease. However, many 
factors have played into the formation of modern day Chile.  
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The conquest of Latin America has much to do with how Chile was formed. After 
Columbus arrived in 1492 there was a race to explore the Americas. Portugal and Spain were in 
heated disputes and in 1494 the Treaty of Tordesillas allowed Spain the majority of the land in 
the new world (Zaragoza 77-8). During the 16th century the Spanish set up viceroyalties in 
modern day Mexico, Peru, Columbia, and Argentina. All the territory they gained was placed 
under the rule of one of these colonial governors. After the discovery of Chile in 1540, Pedro de 
Valdivia founded the city of Santiago in February of 1541. It was formed on the potential of 
agriculture and not on gold and silver as were the other colonies of the time. Other areas such as 
parts of Peru and Bolivia were providing the mother land with large sources of mineral wealth. 
Due to the difficulties involved with the Andes, which runs along the entire eastern border of 
Chile, Santiago and surrounding lands were placed under the viceroy of Peru, rather than the 
Viceroyalty del Río Plata (Buenos Aires).   
Santiago remained part of the Viceroyalty of Peru until it declared its independence from 
Spain in 1810. However, throughout this period there was fighting between the indigenous 
people of the south and the Spanish settlers. The Mapuche in the south were a strong force that 
was able to prevail for over 100 years. Insurrections in 1553, 1598, and 1655 all forced the 
Spanish to move the southern border north.  These tensions were partially resolved when the 
Spanish abolished slavery in 1683. At this time trade between the Mapuche and the Spanish 
settlers became more common, eventually leading to southern settlement by the Spanish. Though 
commerce increased, tensions between the Mapuche and the Europeans continued through 1881 
when the Chilean government claimed control over the Strait of Magellan and victory in the War 
of Araucania. By gaining control of the Strait of Magellan, Chile moved its southern border to 
the tip of the continent.  
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At the same time that the War of Araucania ended, the War of the Pacific between Chile 
and Peru and Bolivia was occurring. The War of the Pacific began in 1879 and lasted until 1883. 
During this time the Chilean armed forces gained control of the sea and land and conquered 
territories in both Peru and Bolivia. The alliance of Peru and Bolivia was not enough to stop the 
better trained and supplied Chilean military. The war began as disputes between Bolivia and 
Chile over land containing large nitrate deposits. These deposits were of great economic value to 
both countries. The area under dispute, known as the Charcas, was not easily distinguished 
because of vague borders between the colonial viceroyalties of Peru and the Río Plata.  A secret 
alliance formed between Peru and Bolivia and the war began on April 5, 1879. Formal fighting 
ended with the capture of Lima, but Peruvian guerilla resistance lasted into 1883. During this 
time there was a Chilean occupation and rule of Lima. On October 20, 1883 Peru and Chile 
signed the Treaty of Ancón in which Chile gained the Province of Tarapacá from Peru, and 
Bolivia ceded Antofogasta. This concession left Bolivia landlocked and has been the heart of 
many disputes between the two nations (Los Héroes Olvidados). 
By the end of the war, Chile had moved northward as well as increased in size by nearly 
one third. In the end, Chile had established the borders that make up its modern day boundaries. 
Spanish colonization, geography, and wars have all had an influence on shaping the nation. 
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 To many, the Chilean economy is a success story of sorts. Its growth and stability in the 
last 30 years has made it one of the premier economies in Latin America. Overcoming the 
geographical boundaries as well as massive political reforms have caused many to consider the 
“Chilean Model” one of the greatest economic examples of the 20th century. Some consider 
Pinochet’s leadership and neo-liberal approach as the root cause of the success. Others find a 
combination of factors, policies, and participants to have shaped the current economic landscape. 
If cause for the growth is a contentious issue, what is understood is that Chile’s current economy 
was shaped between the years 1964 and 1990.   
 Eduardo Frei took over the government as President in 1964. His regime was backed by 
the Christian Democrat Party which won the general election with 56 percent of the vote. Frei’s 
government supported many reforms to bolster a suffering Chilean economy as well as promote 
social justice. His goal was to reorganize the social hierarchy and give power to the working 
class through a series of reforms.  His plans included changes in agriculture, the copper industry, 
and an effort to increase local grassroots efforts for political democratization.  Frei also 
attempted to diversify Chilean exports and industry, so as to make the country stronger 
internationally.  Frei’s plans, though mostly ineffective, had some positive outcomes for the 
country. Inflation rates fell from 50 percent in 1964 to 36 percent at the end of his term in 1970. 
The national GDP grew at an annual rate of 4 percent during his term as president. Additionally, 
income levels amongst the people increased significantly during his term (Ffrench-Davis 5-8). 
 The advances on the surface seemed promising. However, his plans for social reforms 
were rooted in foreign debt and rates of inflation that remained high. At the onset of his 
presidency, Frei was faced with challenges to better the economy as well as the livelihoods of his 
people. His plans were to redistribute the wealth of the nation. To accomplish this goal Frei 
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planned to increase wages and salaries while freezing prices of goods. Frei also planned to raise 
taxes, but in a manner that would redistribute the tax burden to the wealthy. By doing this Frei 
could allow the rural poor to see an overall increase in their wealth. Also, by increasing wages in 
the poorer sectors, Frei believed he could spur demand and bring the Chilean economy into full 
production. The risk to this plan was economic stagnation and a potential downfall in the 
economy (Michaels 81). 
 Although these risks were present, Frei’s plans for the economy were in many ways 
sensible and sound. At the heart of his plans was a large amount of foreign aid, the majority from 
the United States. As part of the Alliance for Progress, Chile received over 1.5 billion dollars in 
aid between 1964 and 1970. Much of this aid was sent by the United States to bolster the Chilean 
economy in an attempt to ward off the feared communist influx found in much of Latin America. 
This aid was to be used by Frei’s government to pay off the large national debt as well as to 
reinvest into the Chilean economy. Along with foreign aid, Frei was banking on the continued 
rise of copper prices to help spur the economy. The rises in copper revenue would allow the 
Chilean economy to gain a favorable balance of trade and begin to pay off the enormous debt 
rather than continuing to accrue it.  For the first three years of Frei’s term his plans appeared to 
be working. Public housing was set up as were grassroots programs amongst the urban poor. 
Additionally, revenue to the government was increased as taxes increased from 13 percent to 17 
percent of the GNP, while the United States increased its aid to amounts upward of 137 million 
dollars in 1965 (Michaels 83).  
 Though the beginning of his term had been successful, the second half from 1967-1970 
proved to be decisive in Frei’s legacy. The once promising plans quickly fell apart as world 
copper prices fell and a severe drought led Chile to import large amounts of its food. Two of 
18 
 
Frei’s key cogs in his plan had been destroyed. Not only were revenues from copper falling but 
the plan to export more than was imported had also been ruined. To go along with these 
problems, the United States began to withhold aid from Chile. Frei continued on in his leftist 
reforms, but a failing economy was hurting U.S. economic interests in the country. By not 
gaining a favorable advantage from the donation of aid, the United States did not have reason to 
continue giving large amounts of money to Chile and the rest of Latin America. With a lack of 
foreign aid and increased imports the Chilean economy was suffering and was forced to find an 
alternate source of revenue.  
Frei looked to the struggling copper industry as a sensible supplier of funds. Copper and 
mining were by far the strongest of the nation’s exports amounting to more than 80% of total 
value. However, these industries were not Chilean run; rather they were controlled by foreign 
firms (Aroca 12). The dominance of private foreign investment meant the only way of gaining 
revenue from the export of copper was through taxes. In the past taxes on copper paid for social 
security, schools, and other social programs. However, the fall in copper prices and a more 
drastic need for revenue led to a need for a change in the industry. Frei met with the heads of the 
largest mining corporations, Anaconda and Kennecott, and began what has come to be known as 
the “Chileanization” of the mining industry. By offering tax breaks to the foreign companies, the 
Chilean government negotiated plans to begin to buy the mining corporations. By 1970, 51 
percent of the Kennecott’s largest mines were state owned. However, by offering tax breaks and 
because of the structure of the negotiations, the company’s foreign investors retained the largest 
amounts of revenue. Frei’s plans to increase the states share of copper revenue were not 
successful. In fact, feeling little pressure from the government, Anaconda opened two new mines 
without following the agreement to allow the state one third shares of the mines. Though Chile 
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ended up gaining full control of these mines after reaching a new deal with Anaconda, one can 
see the weakness of the Chilean government. Though Frei’s administration did not benefit from 
the nationalization of the mining industry, the privatization would prove beneficial for future 
governments. Salvador Allende found it much easier to continue the Chileanization of the 
industry after Eduardo Frei had set the ship in motion. Additionally, Pinochet would use the 
revenues from the copper industry to support his government with a continual flow of cash 
(Michaels 85-90). 
 The Frei administration was characterized by its sensible, yet unsuccessful, efforts at 
social reform. Frei’s plan provided the people with higher wages, started the process toward the 
nationalization of the copper industry, and diversified the Chilean agricultural landscape. 
However, an over reliance on foreign aid and investment set the economy up for failure when 
foreign backing was reduced. Politically, Frei moved toward the left as his administration 
continued and consequently his relationship with the U.S. suffered. The soured relationship with 
the United States meant less aid and less private investment. This coincided with an agreement to 
nationalize copper that provided no immediate returns. Frei’s decision to move his ideology to 
the left, along with bad luck in the form of weakened copper prices and a severe drought, led to 
an exceedingly divided Christian Democratic Party. This division opened the doors for the 
arrival of the socialist regime during the election of 1970.  
 Salvador Allende came to power after winning the election in September 1970. As a 
member of the “Unidad Popular” (Popular Unity) coalition, Allende defeated former president 
Jorge Alessandri and Christian Democrat candidate Radomiro Tomic. The early part of his term 
was marked by an increase in wages and economic growth. This was primarily the benefit of 
taking over a government that had a false sense of strength. Primarily though, Allende was set on 
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implementing his goals known as “La via chilena al socialismo” (The Chilean road to socialism).  
He did this by nationalizing many industries and changing many government organized 
programs. Allende felt that the transformation to socialism could occur better in Chile than other 
Latin neighbors if the change was from the top down rather than the bottom up. Allende’s plan to 
nationalize industry and gain the support of the congress toward his plans would provide a more 
stable and effective change toward socialism. This plan started out well, but soon came into 
conflict. 
 The “strong” economy at the start of his term allowed him to gain the support need to 
begin his socialist changes. He implemented reforms in schools and healthcare by nationalizing 
both. One of his best known reforms was giving every child a liter of milk a day. Allende’s goals 
often focused on allowing the poor to succeed in a Chilean society run by an oligarchy. This put 
him at odds with the wealthy classes when he began to socialize the countries largest industries. 
Allende nationalized the banks and finished the Chileanization of the copper industry begun by 
Frei. He also began to seize property held by landowners and redistribute the wealth (Ffrench-
Davis 7-10).  
By seizing land Allende was able to set into place agrarian reform not seen in Chile since 
colonial times. The latifundio system, which had been in place since the Spanish conquest, 
allowed a small number of landowners to control the nation’s agriculture. In 1965, 90 percent of 
the land was owned by 10% of landowners (Meller 4-10). The landowners could decide what to 
grow, when to grow it, and what to pay the workers of their farms. This created an oligarchy that 
had a non-proportional amount of power. It also prevented advances toward modern technology. 
The landowners were able to control their workers with cheap labor and for this reason felt little 
need to diversify or modernize. They were still making large amounts of money at low costs thus 
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limiting the incentive to move forward. It also posed a large risk to the success of socialism in 
Chile. For this reason, Allende felt the need to break up these large farms and divide them into 
small to medium size parcels of land.  
The nationalization of farms, banks, and principally the copper industry in such as short 
period had a drastic effect on the economy. To nationalize these sectors of the economy the 
government was forced to purchase stocks at high prices and the returns were not sufficient to 
fund the expenditures. The deficit in the government budget rose to above 13 percent of GDP 
and by 1972 inflation had risen to over 200 percent. The economy was in a state of crisis and it 
had the largest effect on the middle class. The prices of goods had been frozen while wages 
continued to rise. This led to black markets that sold essential goods at higher prices. The upper 
class could afford goods provided by the newly developed black markets. Often times, prices for 
basic goods would be 5-10 times higher on the black market than on the official market.  The 
nation’s poor were being helped by the socialist programs that had been put into place. Although 
the economy as a whole was failing, the poor were finding jobs and receiving aid from the 
socialist government. It was the middle class that were being hit the hardest. They were forced to 
stand in the long lines to buy basic goods like milk and eggs. The long lines even led to a 
formation of a new profession, queue stander. People would hire others to wait in lines for them 
so they could buy small amounts of basic necessities (Meller 43-6).  
Allende’s government faced serious opposition by 1973. The wealthy opposed the 
nationalization of industry. They had lost positions and jobs as well as much of their land. 
Obviously the middle class was suffering because of the economic crisis. These groups began to 
demonstrate in the streets, strike in the factories, and caused bottlenecks in economic production. 
This set the stage for a military coup.  
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The coup took place on the morning of September 11, 1973. The military worked 
together to bombard the Presidential palace, La Moneda. La Moneda was destroyed and the 
official record states that President Salvador Allende committed suicide. The military heads, 
known as the Junta, began their reign. It was not until June 26, 1974 that the commander-in-chief 
of the military, Augusto Pinochet, was named “supreme head of the nation.” (Martínez 14-15). 
Pinochet and the Junta gained control of their government through force. In the days following 
the coup more than 5400 people were detained while nearly 550 were officially killed. High 
profile assassinations, such as the death of Carlos Prat, former commander-in-chief of the Army, 
established the power of the Junta. Additionally, between September of 1973 and February of 
1974 over 7300 persons fled Chile as political refugees (Martinez 15). These numbers show that 
while the coup had prior support it was necessary for them to take complete control of the 
government to prevent another coup from occurring.  
Once established as the new government, the military dissolved the National Congress, 
required that all political parties enter a period of “recess”, and finally they disbanded all worker 
unions. Leftist organizations were not to be tolerated under the military government. The 
military regime came to power in September of 1973 and would continue to rule until March of 
1990. During this time period the economy was marked by a neo-liberal approach. The economic 
growth under Pinochet can be divided into two periods the first between 1973 and 1983. The 
second period takes place post 1983 until the end of the military rule in Chile.  
The largest influence on the economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s was brought by a 
group known as the Chicago Boys. The Chicago Boys were a group of Chilean economists who 
had studied with Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago. During the 1960s and early 
1970s an academic exchange program between the Catholic University in Santiago and the 
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University of Chicago was forged. During this decade of exchange many Chileans returned to 
universities in Santiago as full-time professors. They forced out older professors and together led 
the neo-liberal movement in Chile.  
When the military government took power the economy was left in the hands of the 
Navy.  As a group they could agree that the economy under the socialist regime was failing. 
They could also agree that the redistribution of wealth had been a mistake. However, outside of 
this, the navy was too large an organization to rule the economy efficiently. Trained as military 
personnel, they did not have the expertise needed to revamp the ailing economy. For this reason 
the head of the navy turned power of the economy to the new Minister of Economic Co-
Ordination, Jorge Cauas. Cauas and the other Chicago Boys presented a plan in April 1975 of 
anti-inflationary shock (Martínez 85-6). 
The first period of economic change under Pinochet occurred between 1973 and 1983. 
These can be considered developmental years in which the economy took a hit so as to grow in 
the future. The second period is defined by sustained growth and a trend toward democratic rule.  
During the first period, three major decisions were made in regard to the economy. These 
decisions would effect the future growth of the economy. Firstly there was reduction in high 
tariff barriers which inhibited the ability to import goods into the country. Second, state controls 
over key markets were removed. The third decision was to promote the first set of privatizations 
of public entities. The Chicago Boys and the junta felt a great need to privatize certain industries 
that had been taken over during the previous regime. The first area to be privatized was the 
banking industry. All three of these decisions were in place to provide a more laissez faire 
attitude toward the economy (Martínez 48-55).  
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 Eliminating high tariff barriers was important in reorganizing Chilean trade. Trade with 
Chile was difficult because there were multiple exchange rates, quotas on imports, and tariffs 
that ranged from 105-220 percent of the cost of the good. Economic reforms leveled tariffs at 10 
percent, eliminated quotas and set up one easy to understand exchange rate. Unfortunately, years 
of borrowing and a lack of diversified exports caused little immediate return. Large quantities of 
imports were the new trend while exports continued to grow. This new liberalization in the trade 
sector did however, open the doors for growth. By 1995, or twenty years following the reforms, 
imports and exports were in balance at 16 billion dollars annually. Exports also accounted for 
over 37 percent of the annual GDP. These are compared to 2 billion dollars in exports and 20 
percent of the GDP in 1974. Additionally, in 1995 over 6000 exporters were found in Chile as 
opposed to just over 200 in 1974.  This can be attributed to the diversification of exports. Besides 
copper, Chileans found wealth in other natural resources such as forestry and fishing (Martínez 
51-52).  
 The second decision created a hands off approach in regard to strategic markets. This was 
the Chicago Boys’ major attempt to stabilize the high inflation rates the military government had 
inherited. This approach was marked by price liberalizations and a removal of restrictions in the 
banking industry. It also created a more liberal approach to the labor market. Over 3000 state-set 
price controls were removed in an attempt to allow markets to readjust themselves. The banking 
industry was substantially affected by this hands off approach. Preferential financing for small 
farms and entrepreneurs were eliminated. Restrictions on the amount of credit loaned were 
removed and required bank reserves were cut back. Finally the labor market was also affected. 
The real wage was lowered by more than 30 percent between 1973 and 1975. Unions had been 
eliminated, which resulted in a loss of bargaining power for workers. This meant fewer wage 
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increases, reduction in severance pay, and lower non-wage costs of labor. These tactics did not 
work as quickly as the economists had planned. Throughout 1974 and 1975 Chile remained in a 
state of recession with high inflation. The period was marked by high unemployment and 
deindustrialization, though the economy did begin to grow after the recession of 1975 (Meller 
80-1). 
 The last major tactic employed in the early neo-liberal movement was the privatization of 
industry. As a whole over 25 banks, 500 companies and over 3000 farms were privatized by the 
military government; only 41 firms including CODELCO remained public companies after the 
end of the dictatorship. The privatization took place over many years, yet the first round was 
swift, happening within a year of the coup. In this time period over 260 firms were returned to 
their previous owners, and foreign investors who had lost their companies were paid 
compensation in excess of $1.3 billion. However, it was the backlash from the privatization from 
1983-85 that defines this decision.  
 1982 has been claimed to be the turning point in the Pinochet regime. The year has been 
marked by a fall in the economic development that had been occurring since the start of his rule. 
Years of expansion were stifled in large part due to large foreign debt. The accumulation began 
in 1979 when the government enacted a neo-liberal policy removing restrictions on foreign 
borrowing by banks. It also allowed individuals and companies to receive loans in foreign 
currency. By 1982 banks had collected over 1.2 billion dollars in debt and another 1.15 billion 
dollars was being spent annually on interest and amortization payments. CRAV one of the 
largest banks of the time was forced into bankruptcy due to the debt. The neo-liberal economic 
policy was being tested. The government was forced to shift gears on its policies and begin 
regulating the industry. The government reduced its monetary reserves by over 1 billion dollars 
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and bought the debt of the banks. The state was forced to take control over 14 of the 26 national 
banks and 8 of 17 financial institutions (Martínez 58-9). This period led the government to 
reconsider its strict neo-liberalist policies. The military junta decided it was necessary to regulate 
the banking industry and imposed strict policies to do so. These actions bailed the banks out of 
debt and stabilized the economy allowing it to promote growth during the rest of the military 
regime.  
 Following the economic crisis of 1983, Chile experienced unprecedented growth in many 
areas of the economy. Under state regulation, the copper industry thrived. Copper exports more 
than tripled in value between 1975 and 1990. In 1975 Chile had 1.246 billion dollars in copper 
exports. In 1990 there were more than 3.9 billion. Copper was being mined more efficiently as 
well has at greater profits. This was critical in that copper revenues supported the government’s 
monetary reserves. Although the copper industry improved, its importance to the Chilean 
economy decreased. In 1970 copper accounted for 77.2 percent of all exports, by 1990 this 
number had fallen to 47.8 percent. Advances in fruit production, forestry, and the fishing 
industry all took part in diversifying the Chilean economy (Meller 158-9). 
 Along with economic growth, the period following the crisis of 1983 was marked by 
resentment toward the military regime and a desire for democratic initiatives. Unions began to 
reorganize; in 1983 the copper union led 4 days of protests against the government. Though they 
were unsuccessful in results, the protests marked the first time the people had demonstrated in 
more than10 years of military rule. In 1984, Pinochet declared that there would be an election in 
1988 to decide whether he stayed in power or if elections of a new president would be desired. 
On October 5, 1988 56 percent of the electorate voted against the continuation of the military 
government. (Martinez 37-40). 
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 The “Chilean model” is one that has been highly respected. Following the economic 
collapse coinciding with the socialist experiment, Chile has relatively quickly become a strong 
and stable economy. It is looked at as one of the strongest economies in Latin America and the 
country has strong economic ties with the United States, Western Europe, and Asia. Copper has 
remained the key cog in the Chilean market, but foreign investment in the many other natural 
resources of Chile has oiled the machine. However, the question that remains is whether Augusto 
Pinochet deserves credit for the capitalist revolution seen in Chile? The majority of experts fail 
to connect his leadership to the current economic success seen in Chile. Research done by 
experts such as Javier Martínez and Alvaro Diaz in their work Chile the Great Transformation 
and Patricio Meller in his book The Unidad Popular and The Pinochet Dictatorship recognize 
Pinochet as merely one of many actors and participants that have effected the dramatic change in 
the economy.  
 One can first look at Pinochet’s rule. The Junta came to power in direct reaction to the 
political agenda promoted by Salvador Allende. Martínez and Diaz emphasize the point that 
Pinochet and the rest of the military regime opposed the Socialist efforts of the previous 
government, and that the coup took place with no plan for economic reform. It was not for any 
other reason than necessity that economic reforms were put in place along with the political 
changes. Furthermore, the economic plan they followed was not their own. The Junta enlisted the 
help of the group known as the “Chicago Boys” to try and restore structure to the economic 
system.  Meller argues that the Chicago Boys and finance ministers Sergio de Castro and Hernán 
Büchi played a larger part in the economy than Pinochet. They used him and his post as a 
platform to introduce their neo-liberal approach (Meller 177). 
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 The neo-liberal approach that the Chicago Boys instituted focuses on privatization of 
industry and little state regulation on markets. Many feel this privatization was the base that 
supported the capitalist revolution. However, Meller points out that when you look at the 
approach it was not as successful as it appears to have been. In the first ten years of the regime 
the Junta led the country through two serious recessions. The recession of 1983 was the worst the 
country had seen since the Great Depression in the 1930s. Additionally, Martínez and Diaz note 
that ironically it was one of the leftover socialist goals that bailed the military regime out of the 
recession. The fact that the copper industry had been nationalized and had not been returned to 
private control allowed the government to support the banking industry during its collapse. The 
revenue provided by CODELCO is what kept both the banking industry and the Chilean 
economy from succumbing to foreign debts (Martínez 65-6). 
 Meller explains that Pinochet can be viewed as “largely irrelevant” to the development 
of the “Chilean Model.” He compares the Chilean situation to that of other Latin countries, such 
as Bolivia, Argentina, and Mexico, that also faced serious economic struggles following the 
economic collapse in 1982 and 1983. However, they enacted similar reforms to those in Chile 
with similar successes. Additionally, Meller points out, that this was done more quickly than in 
Chile and under democratic rule without the costs of dictatorship and human rights violations 
(Meller 178). 
 Using the neo-liberal model to justify the social costs of his dictatorships he was able to 
paper over the fact that he did not solidify the Chilean economy during his 16 years in power. 
Unemployment and inflation rates remained exceptionally high. Unemployment averaged 18.1 
percent of the population during his tenure. This compares to only 5.9 percent during Frei’s 
government, 4.7 percent during that of Allende, and 7.3 percent during Patricio Aylwin’s term, 
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the first following the dictatorship. Inflation also averaged an exorbitant level of 79.9 percent. 
This does not compare favorably with Frei at 26.3 percent or Aylwin who quickly lowered 
inflation to below 18 percent. It can also be seen that Pinochet did little to develop the economy 
as GDP grew at a meager rate of 2.9 percent annually during his rule (Ffrench-Davis). 
 Though the numbers speak for themselves, the fact remains that Pinochet has been 
viewed as a champion of capitalism and one who has had a direct effect on the current success of 
the country’s economy. If during his rule the economy continued to face the challenges of 
foreign debt, inflation, and unemployment then why is Pinochet viewed in such a positive light 
in the economic arena? It is more a matter of a façade having been built than any real successes 
by Pinochet. During his term he used his power gained with the strength of the military to strike 
fear into his constituents. Few dared to question his policies whether they were positive or 
negative. With little verbal disapproval from the people, Pinochet could rule as he pleased. 
Additionally, one positive from the military dictatorship was the increase in exports. Exports 
grew at a rapid rate of 10.6 percent annually during his rule (Meller 169). More so, it was not just 
copper being exported. The diversification into new industries and an increase in exports 
permitted the world to view Chile as a story different than that which was actually being written.  
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 The end of the Pinochet regime coincided with the beginning of a period of growth and 
development that lasted throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s in Chile. It has already been 
established that Pinochet, though head of the country for the better part of two decades, did little 
to effect the economic turnaround. Instead, one must look to other arenas for the unprecedented 
growth seen in Chile during this time. It can be argued that the Constitution of 1980, as well as 
the Central Bank which it created, laid the foundation for the growth of the country.  
 The Constitution of 1980 provided the basis for the government and economic structure 
of Chile after the fall of the military dictatorship. Constructed during the period of the military 
junta the constitution focuses power on the executive branch. The constitution allowed for 
Pinochet to remain in control of the country until 1988 at which time elections for president and 
congress would take place. The original plan was to provide one candidate for the presidency, 
who, of course, would be Pinochet. In the end, Pinochet decided in 1984 to allow for a vote in 
favor of his continuation as the nation’s leader for another 6 year term. This proposition failed 
allowing for free elections in 1988. The constitution also allowed for the opening of congress in 
1989, with elections in 1988 for the first time in 16 years.  
 Pinochet, however, feared the power of the legislative branch and for this reason had the 
constitution provide for limitations on congress’ powers. In order to prevent one party from 
gaining too much power in the Congress, the Constitution allows for two senators and two 
members of the Chamber of Deputies from each electoral district. One party, however, can only 
win both seats if they receive more than double the votes from the other ticket. This has led to a 
split in representation from both sides of the political spectrum in Congress. This system of 
electoral representation has led the different political parties to form tight pacts and alliances that 
form the coalition governments in Chile (Siavelis 321-23). Although there are four or five 
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dominant political parties in Chile at any one time they largely fall into one of the two coalitions, 
the more liberal Concertacíon or the more conservative Alliance for Chile. Since 1990 there has 
been a nearly equal representation in both chambers of congress from both parties. However, 
Pinochet’s constitution allowed for 9 life-time senators appointed by Pinochet. This allowance 
kept Pinochet’s opposition, the Concertacíon, from gaining a majority in the Senate. However, 
these 9 life-time appointments were removed in 2005 when a constitutional amendment was 
passed and signed by President Ricardo Lagos so that the political dynamics are likely to change 
in the near future. 
 Pinochet succeeded in limiting Congressional power. The split in power within the 
Congress allows for the executive branch to remain the strongest of the branches of the 
government, and the area in which the president retains the most power is the adoption of the 
annual budget. The budget process in Chile was designed in the 1980 Constitution, and is written 
so as to allow smooth and quick passage of the President’s proposal. Every year the president 
must submit their proposal three months prior to its effective start date. Since the Chilean fiscal 
calendar runs congruent with the calendar year the proposal must be submitted by October 1.  
Over the next sixty days an equal number of representatives from both chambers of congress 
meet in a joint budget committee to amend the proposal and agree upon a budget. The two 
chambers must approve the same version of the budget. Additionally, the revisions made by 
Congress can only reduce spending. Congress does not have the authority to appropriate 
additional funds in the budget or reassign funding to other areas. Instead, changes made in the 
budget can only reduce the amount of money a program can receive.  The final caveat to the 
budget process is that if the revised budget is not approved by both chambers within sixty days, 
or December 1st, the president’s proposal will take effect on January 1st of the next year (Baldez 
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29-40). Through the power gained in the budget process the executive office and the President 
can push their agenda with few obstacles.  
 One of the obstacles the executive branch does face is the power of the Central Bank. The 
Central bank, like the current government, was created and designed in the Constitution of 1980. 
The Central Bank played a key role in the Pinochet government during the 1980s as Chile faced 
its worst recession in years and had to confront the problems hindering the banking industry. It 
was the decisions of the neo-liberals in charge of the bank that solved the economic recession 
and prevented the Chilean economy from completely collapsing. The bailout of the Chilean 
banking system halted the recession, yet other economic problems surrounded the nation’s 
ability to grow as an international economy. High inflation and unemployment rates as well as 
the volatile changes in prices of copper and other natural resources were problems that limited 
the growth and success of the Chilean economy in the 1980s. The Central Bank, however, had 
little control over these issues because their power was limited in scope. It was not until the end 
of the Junta that the Central Bank received complete autonomy. 
 The end of the regime led to a series of reforms and amendments to the constitution of 
1980. One of these reforms was the “Basic Constitutional Act of the Central Bank of Chile” 
(known as The Basic Act). The Basic Act removed a prohibition on the Central Bank enacting 
policies affecting state institutions. Instead it gave it complete independence subject only to 
certain requirements. The Central bank consists of 5 members nominated by the president and 
confirmed by the senate who serve 10 year terms with one member rotating out every 2 years. 
The president of the central bank is a board member who serves a five-year term and is selected 
by the President. Additionally, the Central Bank must remain an open organization in that all of 
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its decisions must be relayed to the senate and the president. Additionally, the Central Bank must 
testify twice a year in front of congress (Eliot 11-12).  
 The autonomy of the Central Bank corresponded with the beginning of a new plan of 
fiscal discipline by Chile. Starting in 1990, the ratio of debt to GDP began an annual decline that 
lasted through the beginning of the 21st century. This fiscal discipline strengthened the economy 
as a whole and allowed national and international growth. To manage the economy the Central 
Bank began its efforts toward price stabilization that focused on reducing the inflation rate and 
stabilizing the exchange rate. 
 In 1990 the Central Bank started a policy known as “inflation-targeting-framework” 
(Kalter 13-14). This policy was not officially mandated in The Basic Act, yet it became a 
traditional part of the Central Bank’s annual presentation to Congress, and later became law in 
2001. Within this policy of inflation targeting, the Central Bank announces either its planned rate 
of inflation or a band with an upper and lower boundary within which the inflation rate will land.  
The banded target has been the more popular and pragmatic approach. This approach, rather than 
setting a defined inflation rate allows for slight changes during periods of shock. It also allowed 
the Central Bank of Chile the freedom to alter other goals without the fear of missing the exact 
percentage point.  
 This manner of targeting the inflation rate worked as planned during the 1990s. The 
Central Bank set a long term target goal of a 20 percentage point reduction in inflation in 1990, 
and by 1999 they had reached their goal. Between 1990 and 1999 the annual inflation rate fell 
from 24 percent to a stable annual band of between two and four percent (Central Bank of Chile 
6-8). The annual target centered around three percent has been the accepted target since 2001, 
and the Central Bank plans to keep this target band unless something major occurs that forces a 
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change. If this were to occur, the Central Bank would have to notify congress and the president 
in their annual report explaining the change and their goals for managing the exceptional 
circumstances (Kalter 21-22). 
 An additional step toward price stabilization occurred with the transition from a fixed 
exchange rate to a policy of a free-floating exchange rate. This policy change did not occur as 
rapidly as the change toward inflation-targeting. The fixed exchange rate was a policy enacted in 
the 1970s to avoid devaluation of the peso. The exchange rate was pegged to that of a basket of 
five currencies (dollar, yen, mark, pound, and franc) with the U.S. dollar being the principle link. 
Chile utilized the stability and the strength of these currencies to ensure the same for the Chilean 
Peso. This policy appeared to work for the Pinochet regime until a sharp devaluation of the U.S. 
dollar occurred in 1982. At this time the value of the peso fell drastically and a new plan was 
needed. After several failed attempts at achieving an exchange rate policy that could stabilize the 
value of the peso, a managed float was implemented (Meller 110-14). 
 The managed float was utilized through the end of the military regime and well into the 
beginning of the new democratic government. As inflation rates fell, the Central Bank continued 
to manage the exchange rate, but not in a manner to help the reduction in inflation. Rather, as 
exports became a larger part of the economy the Central Bank attempted to depreciate the 
exchange rate to boost foreign sales and investment. The Central Bank feared an accelerated 
appreciation of the exchange rate would obstruct foreign investment and demand for Chilean 
products. By slowing the rise in value of the peso the Central Bank could efficiently promote 
internationally induced economic growth.  
 As the economy strengthened and the inflation rate stabilized, the Central Bank felt it 
could begin to implement a free-floating exchange rate that would allow the peso to set its own 
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value on the open-market. This policy went into practice in September of 1999. The Central 
Bank did, however, allow itself authority to intervene in the exchange rate during defined times 
of economic trouble. These times are defined as times that “could result in sharp transitory shifts 
in the value of the peso, a steep reduction of the dollar value of peso dominated Chilean assets 
leading to a loss of confidence, exchange expectations of further depreciation of the exchange 
rate.” (Kalter 23) In such clearly marked times of economic difficulty the Central Bank deems it 
necessary to intervene to prevent a sudden rise in inflation rates, interest rates, and a loss of 
control over monetary policy of the country. The free float has worked in that the Chilean Peso 
has remained one of the strongest currencies in Latin America with the only times for 
intervention being during the fall of the Argentine peso in 2001 and the Brazilian economic crisis 
in 2002. Much of the reason for the success of the Chilean Peso on an international market is the 
copper industry. The world’s reliance on copper has allowed Chile to maintain an upper hand in 
foreign trade.  
 Though the Chilean economy has diversified, copper remains the number one export and 
produces a substantial portion of the GDP. Additionally, the largest copper company in the 
nation, CODELCO, is state owned, and the government receives a large portion of its revenues 
from its success. Unfortunately, basing a large percentage of revenues on natural resources 
makes the state susceptible to change in the price of the commodity. This inconsistency can be 
both a positive and a negative for a nation.  For this reason, the Central Bank started the Copper 
Stabilization Fund, CSF, with which to protect the economic policies of the nation.  
 The CSF acts as a hedging instrument or a self-insurance plan for the Central Bank. 
When the price of copper is high, and revenues are therefore abundant, CODELCO deposits a 
portion of its revenues into the CSF. It is then used in times of economic hardship to stabilize 
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losses from a reduction in copper price. The CSF has never had a withdrawal that amounted to 
more than two percent of CODELCO’s annual revenues (Caballero 33-36). Hedging the market 
for copper with the CSF has been seen worldwide as a positive and smart decision. During the 
first decade following the military junta Chile did not suffer any major economic setbacks even 
though it was in a process of development and growth. The shocks suffered in the industry in 
1994 and again with the economic crises in South America in 2001 and 2002 had little effect 
because the CSF could be used as protection during downturns in consumer confidence in the 
region. Other nations such as Mexico have set up insurance policies similar to the CSF. Mexico 
uses a similar hedging system to protect against falling prices in the oil industry. Likewise, many 
other developing nations have looked into forming these systems.  
 The strength of the policies implemented during the early part of the democratic 
government shaped the economic development of Chile during the 1990s. By laying the 
foundation for a central bank, the Pinochet government started to push the financial system in a 
positive direction, however, it was not until The Basic Act granted full autonomy to the bank that 
Chile could grow more sustainably. By targeting inflation and revamping the exchange rate 
policies, new industries could grow and begin to compete in a growing international 
marketplace. Copper maintained its status as the leader of foreign exports, but as we will see 
advances in agriculture along with increased production in the fishing and forestry turned the 
Chilean economy into what it has become. 
 One of the main holdovers by the democratic government from the Pinochet regime was 
the nation’s increase in exports.  After the 1982 financial crisis, the Pinochet government saw a 
need to increase exports as a way to pay back the foreign debt that had accumulated. Chile’s plan 
to gain a favorable balance of trade occurred through a series of trade reforms that increased the 
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desirability of Chilean goods. The creation of the Chile Foundation provided one organization 
that promoted Chilean exports. This publicly funded organization was used to research and 
develop areas of growth that had not previously been profitable. The organization would create 
subsidies in various areas, make the company profitable, and then sell the subsidized company to 
another organization. This program was established during the military dictatorship and for this 
reason seems out of place. This national program goes against many of the principles of neo-
liberalism and against their plans for the economy. However, the Chile Foundation was created 
toward the end by the efforts of many people in opposition to the Pinochet Dictatorship. The best 
example of success by the Chile Foundation was in the farming of salmon. By developing an 
efficient method to harvest salmon the foundation created a new, and very profitable, industry for 
the country (Ffrench-Davis 166). Though the salmon industry is the biggest success story, the 
Chile Foundation has impacted fruit and wine production, forestry, and many other industries 
that have helped diversify the Chilean economy. 
 The success of the trade reforms can be seen in the statistics. While copper has remained 
the primary export of Chile and the most important individual resource in the country, 
diversification into other areas has allowed for less focus to be placed on the ebbs and flows of 
the worldwide copper price. As such, the entirety of the export sector, beginning in the late 
1980s, has grown. First off, the variety of exports produced in Chile has grown immensely since 
the beginning of the dictatorship and through the early parts of the democratic era. In 1970 the 
diversity of Chilean products sold abroad was limited to 200 different items, and copper 
accounted for 80 percent of exports. By 1990 the number had grown to 2800 and continued to 
grow to nearly 4000 by the end of the decade when copper only accounted for approximately 40 
percent of the nations exports (Ffrench-Davis 144). With the large increase in products available 
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to sell, Chile experienced a boom period between 1985 and 1996. During this period the average 
annual GNP per capita grew 6.1 percent compared with only 0.3 percent in the rest of Latin 
America and 0.8 percent throughout the world. Likewise, exports grew at 15.8% annually while 
the rest of Latin America saw export growth at 11.2% and the rest of the world was at 12.3 
percent (Aroca 96). By outperforming its neighbors, Chile established itself as a leader in the 
region, and a player in the international arena. 
 Foreign investment and trade has had a large positive impact on Chile, and the 
investment comes from multiple parts of the world. Chilean trading partners are spread 
throughout the world; rather than relying solely on a small grouping of nations, approximately 
one-third of trade is with other countries in the Americas, one-third with Europe and one-third 
with Asian nations. During the 1990s Chile signed trade agreements with many different nations 
and organizations. The country became a member of MERCOSUR in 1996 and also signed free 
trade agreements with NAFTA, EU, and APEC. By joining in these trade organizations and 
signing trade agreements, Chile continued its goal of opening itself as a free market and enticing 
other nations to invest in Chilean products and resources. Additionally, the favorable balance of 
trade and investment has provided Chile with international reserves in the range of 15 billion 
dollars U.S. as compared with only 1.5 billion dollars U.S. at the end of the dictatorship (Taylor 
118). This amount is large enough to finance Chilean imports for 18 months. The foreign 
investment in Chile has affected all aspects of the economy from manufacturing to agriculture, 
but mining is still the largest profit maker for foreign investors.  
 The copper industry is by far the most successful and important in Chile as it is the 
world’s largest supplier of copper. Copper makes up over 6 percent of the annual GDP by itself 
and sustains itself at 40 percent of annual exports. The copper industry is divided into two parts 
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as copper can be sold as unrefined cathode copper which is copper as is found in the ground or 
also as a refined ore. The two most important refined ores are molybdenum and rhenium which 
are refined from low grade copper to become profitable. The industry is one of the few in which 
the government has retained a large influence.  
 Many state owned enterprises were privatized during the Pinochet regime, however, the 
largest remains in the hands of the government. CODELCO or Corporación Nacional del Cobre 
de Chile is the largest copper company in the world and the largest state-owned enterprise in 
Chile. It was founded it 1976 five years after Salvador Allende nationalized the entire copper 
industry. At the time, all copper mines in the nation were run by CODELCO. Also, the 
dictatorship passed a law that states that 10 percent of all profits of CODELCO will be directly 
invested into the armed forces of Chile. Even today, the largest portion of the military budget is 
funded directly from the state-owned corporation.  
 During the dictatorship, however, much of the industry was privatized by offering 
benefits to foreign investors. As the investment dollars started entering Chile, CODELCO’s 
market share of the industry fell and as of 2007 CODELCO only controls about 40 percent of the 
Chilean copper industry. This compares to the company’s 100 percent share in 1976 and 58 
percent in 1990 (Winn 241-43). As a corporation it owns 118 million tons of ore reserves or 11 
percent of the world’s copper supply. At the current world consumption the current reserves are 
enough to allow for 70 years of profitable operation.  The corporation operates 5 mines with the 
largest being CODELCO NORTE and El Teniente. Between the mines in the northern part of the 
country and the corporation’s headquarters in Santiago nearly 18,000 people are employed by the 
company.  Since it is state owned, the corporation is led by the Chilean Minister of Mining who 
is appointed by the President. Additionally, the board of directors is also appointed by the 
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President. Keeping the company state owned has allowed the country to benefit from the 
production and profits of the nations most valuable resource. In the year 2006, CODELCO 
reported that its payments to the government were enough to “supply the treasury with nearly 1 
million dollars per hour 24 hours a day 365 days a year.” (CODELCO).  
 CODELCO may own the largest individual share with over 40 percent of the copper 
industry, however, it is private companies, mostly foreign, that control the rest of the mines and 
production.  The privatization of the copper industry started during the dictatorship when the 
Pinochet government favored incentives to entice foreign investment in the country. Rather than 
return the mines to their former North American owners, the government offered incentives for 
companies to reinvest in the industry and therefore once again bring their money to Chile. These 
concessions by the government included a fixed tax rate of 49.5 percent. This was in comparison 
to previous tax rates that could be as high as 70 percent. Also, the Chilean government allowed 
for a system of accelerated depreciation on equipment and machinery, and set a policy of no 
restrictions on the repatriation of profits.  
 The enticements of the Pinochet government were able to draw the attention of many 
North American, European and Asian companies. This policy allowed for worldwide investment, 
rather than that solely of the United States. Moreover, over 60 percent of the nations FDI is in the 
mining industry.  As most of the companies were already in the oil industry they had the 
resources to promote exploration and exploitation of the copper industry. Some of the notable 
companies investing in the industry included Disputada de Las Condes, owned by Exxon and La 
Escondida a subsidiary of Mitsubishi (Winn 242). The presence and resources of the foreign 
companies allowed for a revitalization in the industry. Through exploration of the northern 
regions of Chile the companies found reserves of copper previously unclaimed by CODELCO.  
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A loophole in the tax law also made it more profitable for these foreign investors to mine 
unrefined ore and sell it abroad to be refined elsewhere. In 1970, less than 3 percent of copper 
exports were unrefined ores; by 1998 unrefined ores represented 33 percent of copper exports 
(Aroca 100).  
 As copper exports have remained strong and important to Chile, other areas of the 
economy have been developed to provide Chile with the diversification necessary to be a well-
rounded economy. The agricultural sector is one of the bright spots during the economic growth 
after the dictatorship. For the purpose of this paper, the agricultural sector will include normal 
crop production, the wine industry, as well as the forestry industry which has become one of 
Chile’s most important.  Crop production saw significant increases during the second half of the 
1980s and the 1990s. Much of this can be attributed to the redistribution of land. During the 
socialist government of Allende, land was taken from large land holders in an attempt to 
dismantle the latifundio system. It was then redistributed to the people who worked the land in 
small plots. This system, however, was inefficient and the farms often failed in the hands of the 
new owners. During the banking crisis of 1982-83 many farms were seized through foreclosure 
and were resold to new owners. This allowed for an increase in efficiency in farm production. 
Since the beginning of the dictatorship farms of over 1000 hectares have made up about 1 
percent of the farms but controlled about 68 percent of the land. The real change came in the 
decrease in percentage of farms that were less than 5 hectares and were combined to form farms 
between 5 and 100 hectares. These medium sized farms have increased from 40 percent of farms 
in 1976 to 50 percent in 1997. These farms are large enough to be run as businesses and allow 
for more efficient controls that the very small farms cannot. By the mid-1990s, the agricultural 
sector of the economy provided for nearly 25 percent of Chilean exports. (Aroca 144-45).  
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 Changes in the agricultural industry have also occurred in what is produced. During the 
1980s and1990s Chile saw a decrease, by percentage, in land use for what had been traditional 
crops: wheat, sugar beets, and rice. Land use for these traditional crops fell at an annual rate of 3 
percent from over 1.26 million ha in 1976 to only 844 thousand ha in 1997. In contrast, land use 
for fresh fruit production grew at an annual rate of over 8 percent. The change in production can 
be accredited to the desire to increase exports. The Chilean farmers realized they had an 
advantage in fruit production during their summer while the northern hemisphere was in winter. 
Thus, by 2003 Chile held a market share of 11 percent in fresh fruit production. It also became 
the world’s largest producer by value of fresh grapes at 1.143 billion in exports in 2003. Other 
products important to the fresh fruit industry are apples, peaches, and avocadoes.  As of 2003, 
the United States has become Chile’s largest buyer of fresh fruit followed by the EU and Mexico 
(Kipe 8-12).  
 In addition to selling fresh fruit, Chile has become one of the world’s leaders in wine 
production. Wine exports account for over 2 percent of all Chilean exports, and with over 5 
percent of the global market share, Chile has become the 5th largest exporter of wine in the 
world. In 2005, Chile produced over 8 million hl while producing over 900 million dollars in 
exports (USDA). Chilean wine is primarily exported to the U.S., Canada, and EU, and exports 
continue to increase. During the 1990s and early 2000s growth in the industry was seen at 15 
percent annually. The Central Valley is home to a variety of wineries that produce a wide variety 
of wines. Chile is most famous for its production of red wines and the Cabernet Sauvignon and 
more recently the Carmanere are the two most popular grape varieties in Chile. Recently, the 
movement in Chile has been toward organic production. Many of the smaller wineries are 
utilizing these production techniques to improve yields and quality of the grapes they produce. 
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This organic practice has clearly paid off as world market share and export levels continue to 
rise. 
 As land use was redistributed for the production of fresh fruit and wine, land used for the 
forestry industry also increased. Chile has transformed into the second largest exporter of 
forestry products in South America behind Brazil. Between 1976 and 1997 Chile increased its 
land use for forestry 5 percent per year and increased total land use from 627,500 ha to 1.1 
million ha. The rise in land use was a reaction to the decision to promote plantation farming. 
Southern Chile provides ample water for the evergreen pines and eucalyptus plants that are 
common in plantation farming. Comparatively fast growth for pines has allowed Chile to 
develop its industry for both pulp and paper as well as hardwoods for industry. The forestry 
industry accounts for over 14 percent of annual exports and employs over 100,000 people (The 
World Forestry Center).  
 While the land has been reutilized to enhance higher yields, the waters of Chile have also 
become an area of wealth for the nation. Fishing and fish products such as fishmeal and prepared 
fish have become a large and important industry. In 1996, the fishing industry accounted for 11 
percent of all exports in Chile (Aroca 100). The largest market for the fishing industry comes 
from farmed salmon in the south of Chile. The Lake District provides plentiful lakes for both 
foreign and domestic companies to raise salmon. The program started in the late 1980s by the 
Chile Foundation has boomed after two decades of development. The growth is unprecedented as 
only 28,810 tons of fish was produced in 1990 compared to 664,661 tons in 2006 (Barrionuevo). 
As of 2007, Chile had become the world’s second largest salmon farming nation behind Norway 
employing over 45,000 workers in the region (WWF). Additionally, Chile provides the United 
States with more farm-raised salmon than any other nation. There has, however, been a negative 
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impact of the salmon industry. Over two decades of farming has harmed the environments and 
the Patagonian lakes. Many environmental organizations fear the damage, if not controlled, 
could completely destroy some of Chile’s most beautiful and productive lakes. After a large 
outbreak between 2007 and 2008 of Infectious Salmon Anemia, I.S.A., Chile put in place a set of 
reforms regarding farming practices and the use of antibiotics. The reforms were set in place to 
prevent a further growth in the virus that occurs in just 2 percent of Chile’s salmon farms. The 
fear of the virus, did however, slow exports to many of the United States largest consumers such 
as Safeway and Costco grocers. The reforms not only will benefit the environment, but 
additionally will provide security to an American industry that has been scared by the dangers of 
farm raised fish (Barrionuevo). 
 The growth in Chilean industry can be seen through the increases in exports in GDP 
during the 1990s and beginning of the 21st century. By producing over 69 billion dollars in 
exports in 2008, makes Chile the 46th largest exporter in the world and the 4th largest in Latin 
America behind larger countries Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (CIA). The significant growth 
and place on the world economic stage has not, however, been without its negatives. Chile 
remains a country with one of the highest levels of disparity in income. Poverty levels also 
remain high. It can be argued that during the period of international growth Chile has left its own 
people behind. 
 While it is outside the realm of this paper, the economic inequality is worth briefly 
mentioning. Within Chile over 16 percent of the population live below the poverty line and a 
large percentage more live just above it. The Gini index for the country, which measures income 
inequality, is 54.9 which rank amongst the highest in the world and second only to Brazil in 
Latin America. According to the World Bank the top 20 percent of the population controls over 
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60 percent of the wealth, while the bottom 10 percent controls less than 1.5 percent (World 
Bank). This sort of inequality is rare for a country that had developed as Chile has. In a poll from 
1998 53 percent of the population agreed that democratic rule had helped the economy, yet 83 
percent stated their personal lives had not improved (Winn x-xi). The question to be asked then, 
is how does this happen. How does an economy thrive without an improvement in the lives of its 
people? Arguments have been made that Chile developed too fast an in a sense did not think 
about the citizens of the country. More emphasis has been put on international investment than 
has building infrastructure for the people. While 96 percent of the country is literate and 
enrollment in primary education is nearly 100 percent Chile provides very little opportunity for 
vertical class movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 Throughout this paper we have explored the economic structure of Chile and how it has 
progressed since the Frei presidency in 1964. In the half-century since, the nation saw a socialist 
revolution ending with a coup which led to a seventeen year dictatorship. Despite the harsh 
conditions of the military regime, the country moved past it and completely restructured the 
economy. Chile has diversified its industries and is less reliant on the success of copper than it 
once was. The rapid growth in industry has been termed the “Chilean Model,” and is looked at 
by many as an example for how change should occur. This paper disputed that point, arguing 
instead that neither Pinochet nor the neo-liberal policies he enacted were the reasons for the new 
found success of the economy. 
 When Frei took over the presidency he built his platform on reforms that would better the 
social standing of the working class. His reforms were realistic and reachable, however, an over-
reliance on U.S. money and support prevented Frei from securing any significant change. By the 
end of Frei’s term in 1970, Chileans were beginning to see greater social unrest and inequality. 
This led to the socialist regime of Salvador Allende that was cut short by the coup in 1973. The 
Allende plan was based on a slow and steady change toward socialism. Unfortunately for 
Allende, the people began to take control of the socialist revolution and sped up the 
transformation by demanding more from the government and seizing farms and factories. This 
social unrest led to the coup directed by Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973.  
 The coup ended with the military taking control of the government and the beginning of 
the 17 year dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Many critics argue that real economic change 
began to happen during this tenure from 1973-1989. The economy was led by a group of 
American trained economists known as the Chicago Boys. These economists were of the neo-
liberal school supported by Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago. Pinochet in working 
49 
 
with the Chicago Boys supported the efforts to re-privatize farms and industry. However, the 
copper industry remained in the control of the state. The copper industry became a crutch for the 
government to bailout banks and the economy in general after a series of poor policies led to 
Chile’s worst recession since the Great Depression in 1982 and 1983. The Chilean economy saw 
gains in exports and foreign investment during the Pinochet regime, but two major recessions 
along with high inflation rates limited the success of the dictatorship. It was not until the last few 
years of the dictatorship when a push for democratic rule was being made that the economy 
began to grow. This growth continued until the beginning of the current democratic era; when a 
series of decisions allowed the economy to reach a boom period unlike any growth seen during 
the dictatorship.  
 This growth can be attributed to the Central Bank which was given complete autonomy at 
the beginning of the Aylwin presidency. The Central Bank set policies that allowed for a target 
band for inflation of between 2 and 4 percent. This goal was reached after 10 years under the 
democracy and a 20 percentage point drop in the inflation rate. Along with stabilizing the 
inflation rate, the exchange rate was changed as well. The new exchange rate was controlled by 
the Central Bank to help promote foreign investment and development.  
 These policies clearly worked as GDP and exports grew throughout the 1990s and into 
the first decade of the new century. The stability of the economy allowed Chile to diversify its 
industries and limit the risk of a single good economy, which had been the case for decades. 
While copper maintained its standing as the most profitable and most important export and 
industry, new developments in agriculture, forestry, and fishing transformed the economy. Two 
programs have been developed by Chile to help with the growth of the different industries. The 
first of these programs is the Copper Stabilization Fund developed by the Central Bank. This 
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program uses revenues from the state owned CODELCO to support the economy in times of low 
copper prices. This allows the nation to avoid the shock created during a downturn in the price of 
their most important good. The other program developed at the end of the dictatorship is the 
Chile Foundation. This organization has been a key to the development of the salmon farming 
industry as well as the revitalization and growth of the forestry industry. By providing money for 
research and development, the Chilean government has promoted the diversification and growth 
of these new industries.  
 The rapid growth seen after the dictatorship provides evidence that Pinochet’s 
government and the neo-liberal policies he enacted did little for the improvement of the nation’s 
economy. The neo-liberalists led a move toward laissez-faire policies.  While some growth was 
seen in GDP and foreign investment during the dictatorship it does not compare to that of the 
democratic era. In fact, it was just the opposite as the largest growth occurred because of policies 
and programs that went against the neo-liberal policies of the time. The government’s stake in 
CODELCO provided it with the capital it needed to back the banks; while the autonomy given to 
the Central Bank was feared by the Chicago Boys. Additionally, the human rights violations that 
came along with the dictatorship were an intangible cost greater than the economic gains made 
during the military government. 
 Although Chile has clearly grown and developed, the idea of the “Chilean Miracle” is not 
completely true. The economy did not grow without many setbacks first. It was neither the 
change toward a capitalist system nor the neo-liberal policies that brought about the 
development. Instead, it was the democratic era and the autonomy of a once micro-managed 
Central Bank that set sound policy to upstart the unprecedented growth seen in Chile. 
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